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INTRODUCTION
A smartphone can contain hundreds of patents on everything from touch
screen technology, to cameras, to GPS mapping, and just as the saying goes,
“There’s an app for that.” There’s also a patent for that, and worse, we are
finding that there is a patent troll for that, too.1

Patent law is facing growing pains as it tries to operate within a framework
originally created with different technology in mind. As technological
advancements have proliferated in recent decades, cracks in the patent system’s
foundation have become apparent. As Justice Breyer pointed out, “[t]oday’s
patent world is not a steam-engine world. We have decided to patent tens of
thousands of software products and similar things where hardly anyone knows
what the patent’s really about.”2 There is a mounting concern among scholars
and members of Congress that the patent system is infested with invalid
patents.3 While a precise number of invalid patents currently in force is not
measurable,4 studies suggest that the over-granting of patents is a real threat.5
Invalid patents increase transaction costs for subsequent innovators:
innovators must navigate unnecessary red tape and non-practicing entities
(commonly referred to as “patent trolls”) can abuse the patent system by
threatening to assert these invalid patents against others.
The patent system can combat the problem of invalid patents at three stages.
First, more resources can be dedicated to the United States Patent and Trademark
1 Examining Recent Supreme Court Cases in the Patent Arena: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 3 (2015)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa).
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Halo Elecs. Inc. v. Pulse Elecs. Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No.
14-1513).
3 See generally 157 CONG. REC. H4420, H4425 (2011); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F.
Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from a
Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent
Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181 (2008).
4 For a patent to be deemed invalid, a party must bring a lawsuit and succeed in overcoming
the presumption of validity. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). Thus, absent a challenge to every patent,
the number of invalid patents cannot be verified, or even easily estimated. Further, due to the secrecy
of patent applications, statistics regarding the over-granting of patents are unobtainable because
there is incomplete data regarding the percent of patent applications issued. See Lemley & Sampat,
supra note 3, at 182 (“The result has been significant controversy over the underlying question of
what percentage of applications actually issue as patents.”).
5 See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 3, at 648 (claiming that the PTO is over-granting patents to
meet deadlines in the face of substantial backlog). The PTO relieves its burden by granting, rather than
rejecting, patent applications because a PTO rejection is not final. See id. at 625 (describing measures an
applicant can take after rejection); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2190 (9th ed., rev. Nov. 2015) (explaining that while the doctrine of
prosecution laches may limit the number of continuation applications an applicant may file, the doctrine
applies “only in egregious cases of unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution” and lacks any
“firm guidelines”).
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Office (PTO). The initial review of patent applications can be expanded to allow
for a more thorough vetting upon initial receipt. Possible measures of reform could
include hiring more examiners, increasing the time spent on each patent
application, or requiring greater disclosure of prior art by the potential patentee.
But reform at this stage would provide an incomplete solution because it would
fail to dispose of bad patents that are already in circulation.
A second point at which invalid patents can be confronted is the post-issuance,
pre-litigation stage. This approach was followed in the 2011 America Invents Act
(AIA).6 With a concern for invalid patents at the forefront of policy discussions,7
the AIA bolstered administrative proceedings at this intermediate stage,
introducing inter partes review and post-grant review.8 Congress sought to create
an “administrative route more efficient and less expensive than district court
litigation.”9 Still, invalid patents have continued to plague the patent system in
the years following the implementation of the AIA.10 Setting aside the
questionable effectiveness of these administrative routes, there is a more
immediate question of whether these proceedings by the PTO are even
constitutional. The Supreme Court will address this issue in its coming term.11
The final stage at which invalid patents can be eliminated is litigation.
When optimally structured, litigation is a promising method of correcting
errors carried over from the patent issuance stage. An adversarial system
provides an opportunity for a judge to have a (potentially) fair view of both
parties’ positions. The finality of the decision provides clarity for patent owners
and the public. But the current litigation system suffers from procedural
defects, making it costly, time consuming, and ill-equipped to handle an
abundance of patents. Patent litigation costs in the United States are extremely
high, especially as compared to foreign patent systems.12 In addition to the high
costs, parties are tied up for an average of two and a half years before their cases

6 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321 (2012) (describing inter partes and
post-grant review proceedings).
7 See 157 CONG. REC. H4420, H4425.
8 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 321.
9 Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They Work in
Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 126 (2012).
10 See Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa) (noting that in 2015,
frivolous lawsuits brought by patent trolls are still a concern); see also Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the
End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2014) (discussing the inability for postgrant review and inter partes review to capture enough claims).
11 See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 639 Fed. Appx. 639 (Fed.
Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3578 (U.S. June 12, 2017) (No. 16-712).
12 See GEOGRAPHY, LOCATION, AND STRATEGY, 31 (Juan Alcácer et al. eds., 2017)
(commenting that patent litigation costs in the United States range from one to ten million dollars
on average, coming in at ten to twenty times higher than costs in Europe).
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reach trial.13 With these substantial burdens, patent litigation is not a realistic
option for small companies, nor is the system well-equipped to sort through a
large volume of patent disputes. Thus, patent litigation is a good candidate
for reform. A more streamlined system will allow increased access to
litigation, thereby increasing the number of patents that courts can either
dispose of or validate.
This Comment proposes to improve three procedural aspects of patent
litigation: the standard for granting enhanced damages, pleading requirements,
and venue rules. The rules and jurisprudence currently controlling these
elements of patent litigation favor large, wealthy companies, exacerbate the
abuse of the system by patent trolls, and ultimately create inefficiencies.
Recently, the Court in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. addressed
one of these procedural aspects.14 The Court rejected the established
framework for enhanced damages and implemented a new standard. Part I of
this Comment addresses the evolution of enhanced damages jurisprudence
leading up to Halo, and Part II addresses the changes in patent law that the
case brought about. I argue in Part III that these changes in the law will fail
to serve the goals of the patent system discussed above—namely,
implementing a cost-effective, efficient system better equipped to weed out
bad patents. Indeed, I argue that Halo will likely make invalid patents even
harder to eliminate than they were before.
In Part IV, I propose an alternate solution, which seeks to streamline the
litigation process by altering the standards of the three procedural aspects of
patent litigation discussed above. The solution reigns in the discretion that Halo
grants district courts in the enhanced damages analysis. Further, it heightens the
pleading standard and calls for stricter venue rules. By optimizing these
procedural aspects, I propose a litigation structure that allows resources to be
allocated to determining the validity and scope of patents, rather than
squandered in drawn-out litigation fights or settlements of nuisance suits.
I. LEGAL BACKDROP FOR ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW
The standard by which enhanced damages are awarded is one variable
among many that legislators and policymakers can adjust to optimize the
patent litigation system. To better appreciate the significance of the current
jurisprudence, it is helpful to recognize the features that have been
incorporated into the enhanced damages analysis (and those that have been

13 CHRIS BARRY ET AL., 2016 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/
forensic-services/publications/assets/2016-pwc-patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U9H-9JN2].
14 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016).
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abandoned) over time, and compare the evolution of analogous doctrines—
here, the award of attorney’s fees.
A. History of Enhanced Damages
The first United States patent laws heavily favored patent holders’ rights
by making treble damages mandatory in cases of patent infringement.15
Subsequent legislation has moved away from this approach: enhanced
damages are no longer automatic. Since the establishment of discretionary
enhanced damages for patent infringement in 1836,16 case law has shaped the
bounds of this discretion.
Courts have been the primary actors in determining what infringing acts
warrant enhanced damages.
One rule established an affirmative duty to exercise due care,17 subjecting
defendants who did not affirmatively search for patents or obtain opinion of
counsel to the possibility of treble damages. This approach was later
abandoned on the justification that an affirmative duty to exercise due care
was needlessly demanding for the new innovator.18 In Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc., the Federal Circuit adopted a nine-factor test to assist district courts in
determining whether to grant enhanced damages in patent infringement
15 See Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 §5 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952)) (“That
if any person shall make, devise and use, or sell the thing so invented, the exclusive right of which shall
. . . have been secured to any person by patent, without the consent of the patentee . . . shall forfeit and
pay to the patentee, a sum, that shall be at least equal to three times the price . . . .”); see also Transcript
of Oral Argument at 37:23-38:1, Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923 (2016) (No. 141513) (“[H]istorically enhanced damages were automatic, and they were automatic because of a policy
judgment that owning a patent entitled you to not have people infringe willfully or not willfully.”).
16 See Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 §14 (1836) (“[W]henever . . . a verdict shall be rendered
for the plaintiff in such action, it shall be in the power of the court to render judgment for any sum above
the amount found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, not exceeding three
times the amount thereof, according to the circumstances of the case . . . .”). The choice to make enhanced
damages discretionary was reaffirmed by Congress in the Patent Act of 1952. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1952)
(“[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”).
17 See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“Where . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an
affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing. Such an
affirmative duty includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel
. . . .”) (citations omitted). For further background on the policy considerations underlying the
affirmative duty, see REPORT OF THE INDUS. SUBCOMM. FOR PATENT AND INFO. POLICY OF
THE ADVISORY COMM. ON INDUS. INNOVATION 148 (1979) (expressing a desire to foster
innovation in the United States by strengthening patent rights and “increas[ing] the assurance that
a patent is a valuable piece of property”).
18 See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he imposition of the due
care requirement has produced nothing of benefit to the patent system . . . . [W]here such
reprehensible conduct is absent, it is unnecessary to stretch the law of punitive damages to product
the patentee because the patentee can secure a preliminary injunction . . . .”).
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suits.19 Although the Read factors were not an exclusive set of
considerations,20 the enumeration of factors gave structure to the analysis.
This framework served as guidance to both the district courts in their original
decisions and to the Federal Circuit in its review of those decisions.
The totality of the circumstances approach espoused by Read and
subsequent cases faced criticism for setting the threshold for enhanced damages
too low. The Federal Circuit viewed the approach as coming too close to a
negligence standard and exposing too many potential defendants to enhanced
damages.21 Consequently, in In re Seagate Technology, LLC, the Federal Circuit
adjusted the standard by adopting a more rigid test which provided that:
[A] patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement
of a valid patent . . . . If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the patentee
must also demonstrate that this objectively-defined risk (determined by the
record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so
obvious that it should have been known to the accused infringer.22

By requiring a showing of an objectively high likelihood of infringement,
this test elevated the threshold for enhanced damages. The Seagate test also
allowed defenses raised at the time of litigation—not merely at the time of
infringement—to factor into the determination, further increasing the
difficulty for plaintiffs to recover enhanced damages against alleged
infringers.23 An undesirable consequence of Seagate’s strict test was that it
allowed patent owners who were not objectively reckless, but nonetheless
malicious, to escape liability.24
19 See 970 F.2d 816 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (listing the relevant considerations, including whether the
infringer deliberately copied, whether the infringer investigated the patent, the infringer’s litigation
behavior, the infringer’s size and financial state, the closeness of the case, the length of the infringer’s
misconduct, whether any remedial action was undertaken by the infringer, the motivation of the
infringer, and whether the infringer made attempts to conceal the misconduct).
20 See id. (describing the factors as “other circumstances which courts appropriately have
considered, particularly in deciding on the extent of enhancement”).
21 See 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (comparing the prior duty to one “that is more akin
to negligence” and faulting this standard for “fail[ing] to comport with the general understanding
of willfulness in the civil context”).
22 Id.
23 One contentious aspect of the Seagate test was its acceptance of litigation-inspired defenses
to shield a defendant from enhanced damages. See id. (framing the willfulness question in terms of
an objectively high likelihood of infringement, such that “[t]he state of mind of the accused infringer
is not relevant”); see also WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Kohler
does not dispute that its obviousness defense was created during litigation . . . . Instead, Kohler
argues that it is no answer to characterize its obviousness defense as litigation-contrived because
Seagate’s objective recklessness prong requires analysis of all of the infringer’s . . . defenses, even if
those defenses were developed for litigation.”) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1932 (2016):
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B. Jurisprudence of Attorney’s Fees
While the enhanced damages jurisprudence was fluctuating as courts
attempted to craft an optimal standard, case law surrounding attorney’s fees
was likewise in flux. Similar to the rigid test presented in Seagate, the
precedent for attorney’s fees in Brooks Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v.
Dutailier International, Inc. included a test requiring a showing of both
subjective bad faith and objective baselessness by clear and convincing
evidence.25 In Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., the Court
abandoned this test in favor of a discretionary standard.26 The Court shifted
the power to district courts to determine “whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in
the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the
circumstances.”27 Since the implementation of this discretionary standard,
the occurrence of attorney’s fees awards has increased.28
Although parallels can be drawn between Brooks Furniture and Seagate—
and, as will become apparent, between Halo and Octane Fitness29—attorney’s
fees and enhanced damages present different policy considerations.30
Lowering the threshold for attorney’s fees can work in favor of either party,31
Such a threshold requirement [of objective recklessness] excludes from discretionary
punishment many of the most culpable offenders, such as the ‘wanton and malicious
pirate’ who intentionally infringes another’s patent—with no doubts about its validity
or any notion of a defense—for no purpose other than to steal the patentee’s business
. . . . In the context of such deliberate wrongdoing, however, it is not clear why an
independent showing of objective recklessness—by clear and convincing evidence, no
less—should be a prerequisite to enhanced damages.
25 See 393 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that a case is exceptional if “(1) the litigation
is brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless”); see also id. at 1382
(“[T]he underlying improper conduct and the characterization of the case as exceptional must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.”).
26 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1755 (2014) (“The framework established by the Federal Circuit in Brooks Furniture
is unduly rigid, and it impermissibly encumbers the statutory grant of discretion to district courts.”).
27 Id. at 1756.
28 CHRIS BARRY ET AL., supra note 13 at 7 (finding that the percentage of cases in which
attorney’s fees have been awarded increased after the Octane Fitness decision).
29 See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
30 See Tyler A. Hicks, Comment, Breaking the “Link” Between Awards for Attorney’s Fees and
Enhanced Damages in Patent Law, 52 CAL. W. L. REV. 191, 212-13 (2016) (arguing that Sections 284
and 285 have different policy implications and thus should be treated differently).
31 See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE
L.J. ONLINE 15, 25 (2014) (finding, in a study spanning 2003-2013, that “71% of attorney fee awards
go to plaintiffs and about 29% to defendants,” but that “the magnitudes of fee awards more clearly
favor defendants”). Note, however, that a general trend of lowering litigation costs will dampen
patent troll activity, despite the fact that the attorney fees are not categorically contained to one side
of litigation. See, e.g., W. Keith Robinson, Awarding Attorney Fees and Deterring ‘Patent Trolls’, 20
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 281, 290 (2016) (“[S]ome interpreted [Octane Fitness] as the Court’s way
of weighing in on the patent troll debate . . . . Indeed, there is also some empirical evidence
suggesting a decline in lawsuits by patent trolls occurred after Octane Fitness and Highmark.”); Prachi
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while lowering the threshold for enhanced damages only stands to benefit the
plaintiff.32 Consequently, a more generous enhanced damages standard
contributes to the bargaining power differential between parties, skewing
litigation incentives in favor of plaintiffs.
II. THE HALO DECISION
The Court introduced turbulence into the enhanced damages
jurisprudence via its Halo decision by discarding the two-pronged Seagate
test.33 Halo also rejected the requirement of clear and convincing proof to
establish recklessness and abandoned the tripartite standard of review.34 In
place of these provisions, the Court reintroduced a subjective, fact-intensive
inquiry, established a preponderance of the evidence standard for recklessness,
and required an abuse of discretion standard of review.35 Under the new
analysis, district courts are tasked with “tak[ing] into account the particular
circumstances of each case in deciding whether to award damages, and in what
amount.”36 District courts must “limit[] the award of enhanced damages to
egregious cases of misconduct beyond typical infringement”37 and identify
instances in which conduct is “willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate,
consciously wrongful, flagrant, or–indeed–characteristic of a pirate.”38
Although the Halo Court explicitly drew parallels to Octane Fitness,39 it was
also loyal to the broader trends apparent in other recent patent decisions. The
Court has repeatedly adopted fact-intensive analyses over rigid tests, as is
evidenced by recent jurisprudence in the areas of claim construction,40
Agarwal, Patent Troll: The Brewing Storm of Patent Reform in the United States of America, 15 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 71 (2015) (“Although neither [Octane Fitness nor Highmark]
pertained to patent trolls, by broadening the scope of discretion for fee-shifting, a patent owner who
brings a lawsuit without merit is unlikely to get off the hook and . . . the ‘fee shifting’ provision is
likely to discourage patent trolling by making it less lucrative.”); Aria Soroudi, Comment, Defeating
Trolls: The Impact of Octane and Highmark on Patent Trolls, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 319, 343-44
(2014) (advancing the proposition that Highmark and Octane Fitness weaken the threat of patent trolls
by introducing the potential for less costly litigation for the defendant).
32 See Hicks, supra note 30, at 212-13 (“If an award of attorney’s fees under Section 285 is a
double-edged sword, an enhanced damages award under Section 284 is a single-bladed guillotine
available for use only by patentees who prove the infringer acted ‘willfully.’”).
33 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1928 (2016).
34 Id. at 1934.
35 Id. at 1933-34.
36 Id. at 1933.
37 Id. at 1935.
38 Id. at 1932. Also note that, under this standard, there is no longer room for litigation-inspired
defenses to save a patent defendant. Instead, culpability will be measured at the time of infringement,
not at the time of litigation. See id. at 1933 (analyzing the defendant’s culpability “at the time he acted”).
39 See id. at 1929, 1932, 1934 (citing Octane Fitness ten times throughout the opinion).
40 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 835 (2015) (holding that the Federal
Circuit must give deference to evidentiary findings by the trial courts for claim construction matters).
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patentable subject matter,41 obviousness,42 and permanent injunctions.43 The
Court has also expressed its inclination to redistribute power from the Federal
Circuit to the district courts,44 and to bring patent law in line with other areas
of civil law.45
The features of the Halo decision track these trends. The Court replaced
a rigid test with an instruction for district courts to award enhanced damages
on a case-by-case basis.46 Under the Halo framework, conspicuously absent
are guidelines for the district courts to follow.47 This eschewal of a formal test
aligns with the Court’s recent jurisprudence. Next, Halo shifts power and
discretion to the district courts. Without explicit directives, the Federal
Circuit will have difficulty overturning the judgment of the lower courts, as
there will be no clear test to find the district court to have violated.
Furthermore, the heightened abuse of discretion standard of review will make
it more difficult for the Federal Circuit to reverse a district court’s enhanced
damages award. Lastly, Halo embodies a reconciliation of the standard for
enhanced damages in patent law to that of other areas of civil law.48

41 See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010) (rejecting the machine-or-transformation test
as the sole test for patentability and rejecting a categorical rule of excluding all business methods
from protection).
42 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (rejecting the teaching,
suggestion, or motivation test as the sole test for determining obviousness because the Federal
Circuit applied it too rigidly, and instead proposing a more subjective standard).
43 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (criticizing the lower courts
for using categorical rules to decide whether to grant a permanent injunction).
44 See Zachary H. Valentine, A Novel, Nonobvious Approach to Curb Abusive Patent Litigants, 21
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 118, 140 (2016) (recognizing that the effect of recent Supreme Court
decisions, including Octane Fitness and Teva, was to grant more power and discretion to district courts).
45 See, e.g., eBay, 547 U.S. at 390 (holding that permanent injunctions should be granted in accordance
with traditional principles of equity); see also Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014) (reconciling the attorney’s fees analysis with other areas of civil law by rejecting the
clear and convincing evidence standard and instead following a preponderance of the evidence standard).
46 See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016).
47 See, e.g., Simplivity Corp. v. Springpath, Inc., No. 4:15-13345-TSH, 2016 WL 5388951, at *18
(D. Mass. July 15, 2016) (noting that “apart from its emphatic abrogation of Seagate’s willfulness test,
Halo itself offered little by way of a concrete standard to assume the mantle”).
48 In other areas of civil law, enhanced damages are premised on the finding of some variation
of willfulness and are controlled by a discretionary standard. See, e.g., Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver
Cty., No. 1141, 2008 WL 11010686 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 15, 2008) (“[T]reble damages under the
[Consumer Protection Law] should be supported by the presence of intentional or reckless, wrongful
conduct, and should be in furtherance of the remedial purposes of the statute.”); Hodges v. S.C.
Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that enhanced damages may be awarded for
the retaliatory discharge of an employee if “a defendant has acted either (1) intentionally, (2)
fraudulently, (3) maliciously, or (4) recklessly”).
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF HALO
The features of Halo will favor plaintiffs over defendants and large, robust
companies over small start-ups. Unlike Octane Fitness, which changed the
standard for attorney’s fees in a manner that afforded plaintiffs and
defendants symmetrical protection,49 Halo will only benefit plaintiffs, since
only plaintiffs benefit from increased availability of enhanced damages.
Moreover, the increased litigation costs, discussed below, will advantage
wealthy companies, which are less vulnerable to threats of costly legal battles
than are smaller companies.
A. Litigation Costs During Trial Will Rise
Under Halo, parties litigating the issue of willful infringement will be
required to expend vast resources due to the ambiguity and fact-specific
nature of the test. The ambiguous standard will make judgments harder to
predict and settlements harder to reach, resulting in more drawn-out
litigation. The fact-intensive inquiry will inflate discovery costs, leading to
unnecessary acquiescence by potential defendants.
The vague language used in Halo has led to confusion and has cultivated
incompatible definitions across district courts. In the wake of Halo, one court
expressed its confusion by pointing out, “Halo—somewhat confoundingly—
ennobles courts ‘to punish the full range of culpable behavior,’ while also
‘limiting the award of enhanced damages to egregious cases of misconduct
beyond typical infringement.’”50 Left without clear directions, some district
courts have come to inconsistent conceptions of two significant terms used in
Halo: “willfulness” and “egregiousness.” For example, one district court
mentioned that infringement could be willful without rising to the level of
egregiousness,51 while another district court implied that infringement cannot
be willful unless it is egregious.52 With very little guidance for district courts,
Halo sets the stage for inconsistency.
49 See Hicks, supra note 30, at 212 (“[Attorney’s fees] under Section 285 are granted to a party
who proves the opposing party acted in bad faith, regardless of whether the party is the patentee or
the accused infringer.”).
50 Simplivity, 2016 WL 5388951, at *18.
51 See Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 258 (D. Mass. 2016)
(“Assuming without deciding that the jury’s verdict . . . is sufficient to find subjective willfulness,
the Court still finds, in its discretion, that the defendants’ conduct did not rise to the level of
egregiousness meriting an award of enhanced damages.”).
52 See C.G. Tech. Dev. LLC v. Big Fish Games Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00857-RCJ-VCF, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 115594, at *43-44 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2016) (“Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for willful
infringement because they fail to allege any facts suggesting that Defendant’s conduct is ‘egregious
. . . beyond typical infringement.’”). Although both courts are performing similar analyses—
enhancing damages upon a finding of egregiousness—the differing conceptual perspectives highlight
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The confusion among district courts makes their subsequent damage
analyses in patent infringement suits harder for disputing parties to predict.
In an unsettled legal landscape, parties will spend more time litigating.53 The
uncertainty will also incentivize plaintiffs to bring more willfulness claims at
the outset.54 Plaintiffs will have the power not only to obtain enhanced
damages at trial, but also to exploit the threat of such damages to negotiate
higher settlements. Yet another consequence of the lack of guidance is the
potential for novel or fringe arguments supporting plaintiffs’ willfulness
claims to gain traction.55 All of these possibilities will complicate the
litigation process and increase costs in an already expensive litigation system.
To the extent that the district courts and the Federal Circuit do have a
semblance of a test to follow under Halo, it is very fact intensive. Many
district courts have interpreted Halo as reemphasizing the importance of the
Read factors in the analysis.56 Others have considered factors beyond Read:
some courts examine egregiousness,57 others weigh the overall amount of
the lack of a clear framework. While perhaps the discontinuity between the opinions is due to
nothing more than imprecision of language, it underscores the observation that, even on a basic
level, district courts do not have a uniform framework to follow.
53 See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789, 814 (2002)
(discussing legal uncertainty generally and noting “the certainty provided by a settled body of law
leads to a reduction in dispute resolution costs, both by narrowing the universe of potential
controversies and by facilitating settlement when controversies do arise”).
54 The extent of a law’s reach may be ambiguous in the aftermath of a substantive change. In
such scenarios, the new law imposes learning costs on judges, lawyers, and the public. A wide swath
of litigants will likely try to use the new law to their advantage until courts otherwise restrict its
scope. See id. at 820-21 (emphasizing the learning costs associated with changes in the law, noting
that judges and practitioners must “resolve questions of scope and limitation[] and unravel issues of
meaning and effect” while the affected legal actors must figure out the new law’s “application to
actual transactions and disputes”).
55 Cf. id. (suggesting that there is a learning curve that accompanies a change of law as courts
and actors attempt to figure out the metes and bounds of the new legal landscape); Louis Kaplow,
Rules v. Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 570 (1992) (explaining that one burden
associated with standards rather than rules is that “adjudication [under the standard] will also require
giving content to the standard”) (emphasis added).
56 See Georgetown Rail Equip. Co. v. Holland L.P., No. 6:13-cv-00366-RWS, 2017 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15345, at *33 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2017) (affirming the district court’s consideration of the nine
nonexclusive Read factors); Adrea, LLC v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 3d 303, 312 n.16 (S.D.N.Y.
2017) (“If the court finds willfulness, it then considers the nine factors set forth in Read to determine
whether the infringer’s behavior was sufficiently egregious to warrant enhanced damages.”); Greatbatch
Ltd. v. AVX Corp., No. 13-723-LPS, 2016 WL 7217625, at *6 (D. Del. Dec. 13, 2016) (recognizing Read
factors as nonexclusive factors that can be applied); Dominion Res. Inc. v. Alstom Grid, Inc., No. 15224, 2016 WL 5674713, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2016) (“While Halo changed the test for determining
willful misconduct in enhanced damages, we continue to use the Read factors to aid our discretion.”);
Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coast Sys., Inc., No. 13-cv-03999-BLF, 2016 WL 3880774, at *16 (N.D. Cal. July 18,
2016) (“This Court finds the Read factors present useful guideposts . . . .”).
57 See, e.g., Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 212 F. Supp. 3d 254, 257 (D. Mass. 2016)
(“While the Read factors remain helpful to this Court’s analysis, the touchstone for awarding
enhanced damages after Halo is egregiousness.”).
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compensation to the party infringed,58 and still others consider the extent of
consultation with patent lawyers.59
Whether relying on the Read factors or other factors, these approaches turn
on case-specific facts. This fact-intensive analysis will decrease predictability
and increase the burden of discovery.60 More specifically, the type of discovery
encouraged by Halo is especially expensive. Discovery efforts will be heavily
focused on evidence of egregiousness and mental states, factors that would not
otherwise be relevant to the strict liability offense of patent infringement.61
Facing the possibility of staggering discovery costs, defendants may settle at
higher dollar amounts, even for potentially meritless claims.62
A competing line of reasoning suggests that the wide discretion granted to
district courts is a feature, not a bug, of the system. Proponents of Halo may argue
that district courts, well grounded in the facts of each case, will establish patterns
in their enhanced damages decisions. Although the boundaries of the Halo
standard are relatively undefined now, this uncertainty will, the argument goes,
be shed as the body of case law becomes more robust. That is, the fact-intensive
nature of the doctrine will eventually create clarity and guide future litigants.63
According to this argument, the case-by-case approach will lead to greater
predictability of outcomes which, in turn, will lower litigation costs.
58 See, e.g., Sociedad Espanola De Electromedicina Y Calidad, S.A. v. Blue Ridge X-Ray Co.,
No. 1:10-cv-00159-MR, 2016 WL 3661784, at *7-8 (W.D.N.C. July 8, 2016) (noting that the Read
factors are not dispositive and considering an additional factor of whether plaintiff has already been
“amply compensated for the Defendants’ infringement”).
59 See, e.g., LoggerHead Tools, LLC v. Sears Holdings Corp., No. 12-cv-9033, 2016 WL 5112017,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2016) (using evidence regarding consultations with patent lawyers as an
indication of good faith).
60 The pre-Seagate enhanced damages jurisprudence was likewise criticized for its contribution to
the expense of trials. It was noted that “[t]he willfulness inquiry is a highly subjective, fact-intensive
analysis. Because of this, it is expensive and contributes to less predictable trial outcomes.” Jonathan
M. Jackson, If It Ain’t Broke Don’t Fix It: The Pitfalls of Major Reform of the Doctrine of Willful Patent
Infringement in the Wake of Knorr-Bremse, 15 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37, 72-73 (2006). Note
that this same argument rings true in the post-Halo landscape, where the standard is once again
subjective and case-specific.
61 See Samuel Chase Means, Comment, The Trouble with Treble Damages: Ditching Patent Law’s
Willful Infringement Doctrine and Enhanced Damages, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1999, 2016 (2013)
(explaining that evidence addressing the willfulness inquiry is often complex, prejudicial, and
otherwise superfluous against the backdrop of a strict liability offense).
62 See Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Address at
the Eastern District of Texas Judicial Conference: The State of Patent Litigation 8 (Sept. 27, 2011)
(transcript available at https://perma.cc/4MUN-NA6P) (“Our courts are in danger already of
becoming an intolerably expensive way to protect innovation or prove freedom to operate. These
vast expenses can force accused infringers to acquiesce to nonmeritorious claims. This only serves
as an unhealthy tax on innovation and open competition.”).
63 This argument can be couched in the more general terms of the value of legal precedent and
robust case law. See Van Alstine, supra note 53, at 824-25 (discussing the beneficial role of precedent
and emphasizing that, in contexts of high uncertainty, case law “may be the only effective means of
bringing coherence to the law”).
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This line of reasoning is unpersuasive on several grounds. First, it rests on
the optimistic assumption that patterns will eventually emerge in the
jurisprudence. However, the development of a clear and coherent doctrinal
framework is not inevitable. With the plethora of approaches that district courts
may choose to employ,64 it could take an overwhelming number of cases before
a consensus forms, or one may never form at all. The heightened standard of
review will also delay the generation of robust doctrine across jurisdictions.
Second, this argument fails to account for the other shortcomings of Halo.
Even if some of the ambiguity is resolved over time, the resulting test will
nonetheless remain highly fact-intensive. Employing such a fact-intensive
test will keep discovery costs high and litigation drawn-out. Finally, as is
discussed below, Halo’s faults lie not only in the elevation of litigation costs
during trial, but also in the lowered threshold for enhancing damages and the
skewed incentives that will lead to forum shopping.65 Even in an ideal
scenario where a clear pattern emerges, the presence of such a pattern will be
inadequate to compensate for the potentially high damage awards and
prevalent forum shopping resulting from Halo.
B. The Frequency of Enhanced Damage Awards Will Increase
In addition to the elevated costs incurred during litigation, the total costs
may be inflated due to the more generous standard for enhancing damages.66
The language in Halo explicitly reveals the Court’s intention to capture more
bad actors than it was previously able to under the Seagate test.67 However,
by lowering the threshold to capture these bad actors, Halo creates a standard
that subjects a broad array of defendants to the threat of enhanced damages.
The lower threshold for enhanced damages is a product of multiple facets
of the Halo decision. The increased flexibility and authority afforded to
district courts allows them to be more generous in enhancing damages.
Depending on how a district court construes willfulness and egregiousness,68
and on which factors it decides to place an emphasis,69 the realm of enhanced
damages can be sculpted to fit a court’s inclinations. Other aspects of Halo
also reduce the threshold for awarding enhanced damages. The decreased
evidentiary standard for recklessness expands the range of conduct from

64
65
66

See supra notes 53–59.
See infra Sections III.B and III.C.
See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (rejecting the “unduly
confin[ing]” Seagate test and thereby lowering the enhanced damages threshold as a consequence).
67 See id. at 1932 (criticizing Seagate for “insulating some of the worst patent infringers from
any liability for enhanced damages”).
68 See supra text accompanying notes 50–51.
69 See supra text accompanying notes 53–59.
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which liability for enhanced damages can arise.70 Additionally, the heightened
standard for review further insulates the district courts, allowing them to
grant enhanced damages with less fear of being overturned.
These features allow district courts to award enhanced damages more
often, raising the final cost of litigation.71 The expanded authority to enhance
damages will also affect settlement negotiations. Defendants, especially small
start-ups, will face increased pressure to settle if there is a greater likelihood
of enhanced damages.72 By lowering the threshold for enhanced damages, the
final price tag after trial or after settlement negotiations will be elevated.
C. Forum Shopping Will Become More Prevalent as
Power Shifts to District Courts
Not only does Halo encourage plaintiffs to bring suit, but it also
incentivizes them to forum shop. With the heightened standard of review
making it more difficult for the Federal Circuit to overturn district court
verdicts, parties will devote more resources at the district court level.73 The
greater emphasis placed on district court proceedings will motivate plaintiffs
to find a forum that will be most favorable to them.
Under the Court’s recent ruling in TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Group
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017), patent venue is only proper in the
defendant corporation’s state of incorporation or “where the defendant has
70 See Halo, 136 S. Ct. at 1934 (changing the standard to a preponderance of the evidence
standard). Note that, although Halo lowers the evidentiary standard for recklessness from clear and
convincing to preponderance of the evidence, it is not apparent under the sparse guidance that a
finding of recklessness is necessary at all. See id. at 1932 (listing acceptable grounds for enhancing
damages, including a finding that conduct is “characteristic of a pirate”). This interpretation would
further lower the threshold for enhanced damages.
71 At a minimum, district courts will have the opportunity to award enhanced damages in a
greater variety of scenarios. Although drastic changes have not been observed in the approximately
one year following Halo, changes may still be on the horizon. See, e.g., QUINN EMANUEL
URQUHART & SULLIVAN, LLP, Enhanced Patent Damages in the Wake of Halo May Not Be So Easy to
Come By, JDSUPRA (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/enhanced-patent-damagesin-the-wake-of-96269/ [https://perma.cc/NYD2-XPLX] (“It appears that the initial concern that
Halo would unleash a wave of decisions granting enhanced damages has not come to pass, although
time will tell what the true impact of Halo will be.”). Shifting litigation incentives reveal themselves
over time, and thus a greater body of case law is needed to determine how district courts will exercise
their expanded authority.
72 See Soroudi, supra note 31, at 326 (“Because many small companies have no other business
alternatives and cannot afford the risks and costs of litigation, they are forced to settle for needless
licenses. Patent trolls know this and exploit these small companies for a quick profit.”).
73 Cf. Mateo J. de la Torre, Note, The Troll Toll: Why Liberalized Fee-Shifting in Patent Cases Will
Do More Harm Than Good, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 836 (2016) (“Indeed, an increased likelihood
of an adverse fee award coupled with a decreased ability to challenge such award on appeal will no
doubt raise the stakes at the trial level, incentivizing patent litigants to fight even harder and expend
more resources at trial.”).

2018]

Halo Is Not the Saving Grace

1043

committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of
business.”74 In response to TC Heartland, some courts have nonetheless
interpreted patent venue broadly, giving plaintiffs substantial power in
choosing where to bring suit.75 Plaintiffs seek out courts that award higher
damages, have greater predictability, have a higher chance to go to trial, are
speedier, or some combination of the preceding factors.76
These tactics lead to negative consequences. Litigation costs rise as parties
fight over venue.77 Unfairness concerns surface when plaintiffs exploit the
unevenness across jurisdictions in order to seek out venues most favorable to
them.78 Given that the Federal Circuit was created, in part, to standardize
district-court jurisprudence and decrease the prevalence of forum shopping,79 the
behavior incentivized by Halo is problematic as it undermines this policy goal.
Admittedly, the selection of favorable districts by plaintiffs is already a
commonplace behavior in patent law. For patent infringement suits, plaintiffs
in recent history have tended to concentrate their cases in the Eastern District
of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Eastern District of Virginia.80 The
Patent Pilot Program further concentrates patent cases by funneling cases to
willing, expert judges.81 Even though patent cases are already being channeled
into certain jurisdictions, the compounding effects of Halo should not be
ignored. The different considerations used by district courts in their enhanced
damages analyses will exacerbate forum shopping abuses.82 In their calculus
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1999). Note that this decision was a change to the settled Federal
Circuit interpretation allowing patent venue to be as broad as personal jurisdiction. See VE Holding
Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
75 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., No. 17-379-LPS, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 146372, at *31 (D. Del. Sept. 11, 2017) (finding it possible that an ANDA applicant “has
committed acts of infringement” based on “acts the ANDA applicant non-speculatively intends to
take if its ANDA receives final FDA approval”). But see In re Cray, Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (rejecting the Eastern District of Texas court’s generous approach to “regular and
established place of business,” instead emphasizing that the physical place must be “a place of the
defendant, not solely a place of the defendant’s employee”). With the possibility of a broad
interpretation of § 1400(b), it is unclear just how effective TC Heartland will be at limiting patent
venue, and by extension, forum shopping.
76 See J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 635, 643
(2015) (discussing how courts compete for litigants and listing the various characteristics of courts
that draw patent litigants).
77 See id. at 641, 645 (noting the frequency and intensity of venue disputes in patent litigation).
78 See id. at 637 (mentioning the problems brought about by forum shopping, “ranging from
reduced trust in the judicial process to uneven playing fields for litigants”).
79 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 2 (1989) (discussing the motivations for creating the Federal Circuit, including the desire to
“produce horizontal equity, and reduce opportunistic litigation strategies such as forum shopping”).
80 See Anderson, supra note 76, at 651-58 (summarizing patent activity in these three districts
and addressing the benefits that each district offers plaintiffs).
81 See id. at 637.
82 See supra text accompanying notes 53–59.
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regarding where to file, patent trolls will prioritize jurisdictions in which the
district court’s approach to enhanced damages is the most generous, all else
being equal. Although forum shopping is already rampant in patent law, there
is no justification to further cement these nonoptimal litigation incentives.
The full implication of Halo on forum shopping will be elucidated by
courts’ continuing interpretation of TC Heartland. Given early responses to
TC Heartland,83 plaintiffs, including patent trolls, continue to have significant
power in selecting the forum.84 By allowing diversity among district courts,
Halo bolsters the threat of forum shopping, making any upcoming changes by
the Court or by Congress especially pertinent.
D. The Confluence of Factors Will Frustrate the Goal of
an Efficient Litigation Regime
Halo’s ambiguous, fact-intensive test, coupled with depressed evidentiary
burdens and heightened standards of review, produces undesirable effects. A
plaintiff ’s higher potential recovery skews the bargaining power in favor of
large companies that can afford extensive litigation. The greater prominence
afforded to district courts will fuel forum shopping. This will prolong
litigation and favor large companies that are able to expend greater resources
on fighting for a favorable forum. These factors work together to create a
doctrine that is ripe for abuse by patent trolls. Wealthy, patent-holding
plaintiffs will be incentivized to bring nuisance suits, spoiling the efficiency
of the patent system. More generally, the high costs and protracted arguments
will prevent the judicial system from reviewing a high volume of patents.
Not only will Halo add cost to an already expensive litigation system, but
it will also discourage parties from reaching trial. The threat of high litigation
costs and the potential for enhanced damages may sway small defendants to
settle even meritless cases. Parties will favor settlement, if the alternative is
an incredibly expensive trial.85 With fewer cases being resolved at trial and
expounded upon in court opinions, it will take longer for patterns to emerge
in the jurisprudence. Courts will not have the opportunity to affirm the
validity of “good” patents or weed out “bad” patents.
Halo also has upstream implications. Innovators in crowded fields or in
industries dominated by patent trolls may be deterred from pursuing
research. They may find that the risk of an infringement suit and the threat
83
84

See supra note 75.
Note that a decrease of filings in the Eastern District of Texas in response to TC Heartland
does not by itself prove that plaintiff ’s choice of venue has been sufficiently constrained. Many other
districts remain available to plaintiffs, thus leaving the door open for forum shopping abuses.
85 See Soroudi, supra note 31, at 325 (noting that patent trolls use the threat of high litigation
costs to influence others to yield to licensing settlements).
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of treble damages under Halo’s uncertain, plaintiff-friendly jurisprudence will
outweigh potential profits. In particular, small start-up companies will be
disproportionately harmed.86 These emerging companies will face substantial
barriers to entry in the form of nuisance suits. The standard set forth by Halo
is thus impeding a fundamental aim of the patent system: “to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.”87
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The patent system is intended to balance the competing interests of
patent holders, innovators, and the public.88 To date, no enhanced damages
standard has been perfectly calibrated to balance these interests. The Seagate
standard was under-inclusive, overly-formalistic, and not responsive to the
particulars of each case.89 Nor does the Halo test strike the right balance. The
fact-intensive and open-ended standard tips the balance too far in the other
direction, ultimately empowering large companies and patent trolls. The
solution presented in this paper contemplates a middle ground between the
Seagate and Halo doctrines, capturing undesirable behavior while providing a
workable and cost-effective framework for courts to follow. In addition to
advancing a revised enhanced damages standard, the proposal incorporates
changes to the pleading requirements and venue rules. Each of these
procedural aspects—enhanced damages, pleading standards, and venue—can
be tailored such that the resulting litigation will be less burdensome and thus
a better tool for the resolution of patents.
A. Limit District Court Discretion in the Enhanced Damages Analysis
The discretion of the district courts should be appropriately cabined. This
proposal limits the factors that can be considered during the subjective

86 See id. (commenting that small companies are especially targeted by patent trolls). But see
de la Torre, supra note 73, at 838-39 (pointing out that since small firms might also be plaintiffs,
efforts to shift the balance more in defendants’ favor could harm small, patent-holding firms).
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
88 See 2015 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 6435 at *15 (citing Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979)):

[T]his Court consistently has considered the . . . delicate balance among the
competing public interests of (1) the would-be inventor lured by the promise of patent
exclusivity; (2) the subsequent artisan seeking to build on previous advances either by
licensing patent technology at a fair price or inventing around the patent; and (3) the
public desiring unencumbered use of the public domain.
89 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19:13-16, 136 S. Ct. 1923 (“[H]aving taken the bar too
low in Underwater Devises [the Court] overcompensated in Seagate. We think the bar ought to be
high. We just don’t think it ought to be arbitrarily high as it is now.”).
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inquiry into the question of willfulness. The analysis should be restricted to
a subset of the Read factors. Instead of granting district courts the discretion
to consider all circumstances, courts should focus on (1) whether there was
deliberate copying, (2) whether there were any remedial actions taken by the
defendant, (3) whether there were attempts to conceal the defendant’s
misconduct, and (4) the size and financial condition of the defendant.90
These particular Read factors are chosen for their salience in the analysis
and their objectivity. The presence of deliberate copying is at the core of willful
infringement, and thus should be the focus of a court’s inquiry.91 The other
three factors involve ascertainable facts: remedial actions, concealment of
misconduct, and financial characteristics. Unlike other Read factors, which
inquire into the subjective motivation of the defendant or presence of a good
faith belief, these factors allow for a more straightforward analysis, expediting
litigation. The knowledge factor from Read is not included here because, as the
Halo concurrence emphasizes, knowledge alone is not enough for awarding
enhanced damages.92 Accordingly, inquiring into whether the defendant had
knowledge of the patent is an inefficient allocation of judicial resources.
By limiting the analysis to four factors, courts’ competing interpretations of
“willfulness” and “egregiousness” become less problematic. Because courts would
have to ground their enhanced damages decisions in the above factors, the
outcome of a case would not depend on the particular construction of “willfulness”
and “egregiousness.” The four enumerated factors, especially the deliberate
copying factor, serve as an adequate proxy for willfulness and egregiousness.
With this constrained discretion, district courts will retain some flexibility
to consider the circumstances of each case, but parties will know in advance
which facts will be most salient. This knowledge will keep discovery costs in
check and will narrow the scope of arguments raised in litigation. It will also
protect the threshold for enhanced damages from future erosion,93 thereby
decreasing the frequency of such awards. To the extent that the emergence of
a pattern from Halo was dismissed earlier with skepticism,94 this proposal
offers a greater chance that a pattern will emerge because there would be
fewer factors for judges to consider.

90
91

Cf. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (providing the full set of factors).
See, e.g., Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016) (discussing the
companion case, Stryker, and taking issue that the defendant “had all-but instructed its design team
to copy [Plaintiff]’s products”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 See id. at 1936 (emphasizing that mere knowledge does not rise to the level of willful
infringement and interpreting the majority’s opinion as instead placing a greater emphasis on the
egregiousness of the conduct).
93 See supra discussion in Section III.A (discussing how Halo’s open-ended standard may open
the floodgates for arguments during litigation).
94 See supra text accompanying notes 60–61.
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The increased certainty and decreased discovery costs would provide
numerous additional benefits. The negotiating power of patent trolls would
be reduced and nuisance suits would become less effective.95 Lower litigation
costs would increase parties’ willingness to proceed to trial, allowing courts
to clear out more invalid patents from the current landscape. Additionally,
district court decisions would become more standardized, which may decrease
incentives for forum shopping.96
B. Raise the Pleading Standards for Willful Infringement
The constrained discretion standard will not completely eliminate the
expensive nature of patent litigation. The analysis will still be rooted in the facts
of each case, requiring costly discovery. To account for this, the pleading
standard for willful infringement should be heightened. A heightened pleading
standard would police the claims at an earlier and less costly stage of litigation.97
Instead of the current plausibility standard,98 the threshold should be raised
to match the fraud pleading standard. The burden would be on the plaintiff to
“state with particularity the circumstances constituting” the willful
infringement.99 In light of the four factors chosen by this proposal, the plaintiff
would have to state with particularity circumstances that would implicate
deliberate copying, lack of remedial action by the defendant, concealed
misconduct, or a strong financial condition of the defendant. Under the current
system, a heightened pleading standard would be impractical because it is
unclear what factors a district court will deem important to its analysis. Here,
however, the exclusive factors provide guidance as to what types of allegations
would support a finding of willful infringement. Thus, the change to the
pleading standard becomes a workable addition to this proposal. Pleadings that
do not meet this standard would be subject to dismissal by the Court.100
The justifications for the heightened pleading requirements for fraud are
compatible with the enhanced damages context. The high pleading standard
95
96

Cf. Soroudi, supra note 31, at 326 (noting that expensive and uncertain litigation benefits patent trolls).
Although uniformity tends to limit a party’s incentive to forum shop, this constrained
discretion model may only have a marginal impact. Given that other variables affect a plaintiff ’s
decision regarding venue, this factor alone will not be dispositive. See supra text accompanying notes
73-79 (discussing other considerations at play with respect to forum shopping).
97 Previous proposals have suggested requiring plaintiffs to more specifically point out
allegedly infringing products and particular patent claims implicated at the pleading stage. Similar
to the proposal advanced in this Comment, such heightened pleading standards “could beneficially
shift the burden back to the plaintiff to do more diligence before filing a suit.” See Jared A. Smith
& Nicholas R. Transier, Trolling for an NPE Solution, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 215, 235-36
(2015) (discussing the heightened requirements contemplated by the Innovation Act).
98 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
99 FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
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for fraud is intended to protect “defendants’ reputations . . . from lightly
made allegations of morally reprehensible acts.”101 Likewise, reputational
harm can occur as patent holders allege that companies engaged in egregious
or malicious behavior.102 More notably, the pleading standard for fraud is also
justified on the grounds that the heightened requirements will protect
potential defendants against “baseless suits filed for nuisance or settlement
value.”103 Again, this rationale can be extended to the willful infringement
context. Limiting the number of nuisance suits has been repeatedly
articulated as an important policy goal in the patent law sphere.104
Although a heightened pleading standard has not yet been adopted, some
district courts have already moved toward elevated requirements for willful
infringement claims. For example, in Princeton Digital Image Corp. v. Ubisoft
Entertainment SA, the Delawa\re district court held that a claim for willful
infringement was insufficient because the plaintiff did not adequately allege
that the defendant was put on notice. The court further held that the plaintiff
did not “sufficiently articulate how [defendant]’s actions . . . amount to an
‘egregious’ case of infringement of the patent.”105 By mandating a heightened
pleading standard across all jurisdictions, not only will this protect
reputations and limit nuisance suits, but it will also bring with it the benefits
that flow from a more uniform litigation system.
The heightened pleading requirement will result in more claims being
dismissed at the pleading stage. Considering the staggering expense of

101 Morwenna Borden, Note, Particulars of Particularity: Alleging Scienter and the Proper
Application of Rule 9(b) to Duty-Based Misrepresentations, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1116-17 (2014).
102 The threat of reputational damage is arguably less severe in the patent infringement context
given the commonplace nature of willful infringement claims. See Means, supra note 61, at 2019
(discussing the frequency of willful infringement allegations).
103 Borden, supra note 101, at 1116.
104 See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Hon. Darrell E. Issa) (emphasizing the
undesirability of “frivolous lawsuits that amount to litigation extortion”).
105 No. 13-335-LPS-CJB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153207, at *40 (D. Del. Nov. 4, 2016); see also
CG Tech. Dev., LLC v. Big Fish Games, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115594, at *43-44 (D. Nev.
Aug. 29, 2016) (finding a claim for willful infringement insufficient because it “fail[s] to allege any
facts suggesting that Defendant’s conduct is ‘egregious . . . beyond typical infringement’” and
instead only makes “conclusory allegations”); Varian Med. Sys. v. Elekta AB, No. 15-871-LPS, 2016
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91226, at *26-27 (D. Del. July 12, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff ’s claim on the basis
that it “does little more than provide a formulaic recitation of the pre-Halo elements of a willful
infringement claim” and fails to “articulate how the . . . making, using or offering for sale . . . actually
amounted to an egregious case”). Not all jurisdictions have required such bolstered allegations,
though. See, e.g., Scripps Research Inst. v. Illumina, Inc., No. 16-cv-661 JLS (BGS), 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 161279, at *22 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2016) (requiring merely a plausible allegation of knowledge
of the patent); Malibu Boats, LLC v. MasterCraft Boat Co., LLC, No.: 3:16-CV-82-TAV-HBG,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183202, at *10 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 28, 2016) (same); Blitzsafe, Tex. LLC v.
Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1274-JRG-RSP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124144, at *23-24
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 19, 2016) (same).
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discovery for the willfulness inquiry,106 avoiding this avenue completely in
certain cases will make litigation costs more manageable. Knowing in advance
that enhanced damages are foreclosed and, accordingly, that less resources
will have to be expended during discovery, parties may be more willing to
proceed to trial. The heightened standard may also signal to parties that
willful infringement should not be awarded in run-of-the-mill infringement
cases.107 The elevated standard could alter the current norm of automatically
including willful infringement claims.108 Over time, this behavioral shift
would decrease the average damages awarded in patent litigation.
C. Limit Choice of Venue
The third feature of this proposal consists of a change in venue rules that
will temper forum shopping. If the heightened standard of review as
established in Halo is maintained, the importance of the role of district courts
will remain elevated.109 This proposal’s attempt to standardize jurisdictions
by constraining the discretion of district courts will only do so much to curb
the forum shopping abuses. Thus, this proposal can be further bolstered by a
reform of the venue statute. As the holding in TC Heartland is susceptible to
a very generous interpretation, a statutory change is a more promising avenue
for tightening venue selection.110
While the particulars of venue reform are beyond the scope of this paper,
any general move toward restricting the plaintiff ’s choice of venue would
complement the aims of this proposal.111 By reducing the opportunities to
litigate over forum, litigation costs will accordingly decrease. This will benefit
smaller companies that are not able to afford costly fights over forum.
Decreased litigation costs will lead to more cases going to trial and the
resolution of more disputes over patent validity. Moreover, limiting forums
available to plaintiffs can prevent plaintiffs from choosing excessively
“plaintiff-friendly” venues.112 For example, by removing venues with high
106 See Means, supra note 61, at 2014 (observing that the United States “is the most expensive
jurisdiction in the world for patent litigation,” due to the direct and indirect expenses of patent litigation).
107 This goal was also espoused by Halo. See 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016) (stating that damages
should not be enhanced for “garden-variety cases”).
108 Cf. Means, supra note 61, at 2019 (finding that it is common practice to allege willful
infringement and likening these claims to “‘boilerplate’ for any infringement action”).
109 See supra text accompanying note 74.
110 See supra Section III.C.
111 For a more comprehensive discussion of patent venue reform, see generally Ana Santos Rutschman,
Patent Venue Exceptionalism after TC Heartland v. Kraft, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 29 (2016-2017).
112 See generally Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (advancing reasons why
the Eastern District of Texas is popular among plaintiffs, particularly patent trolls, and advocating
for venue reform). If venue is limited to, for example, the state of incorporation, this would prevent
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discovery costs from the equation, average litigation costs will be reduced,
promoting more cases to proceed to trial instead of settling. Taking power away
from plaintiffs in this way may also decrease the occurrence of nuisance suits.
Although limiting nuisance suits leads to fewer lawsuits, courts would
consequently be able to allocate resources to more meritorious patent disputes.
CONCLUSION
With an accumulation of invalid patents and a post-issuance administrative
system that offers an incomplete—and possibly unconstitutional—solution,113
litigation becomes the backstop for resolving issues in the patent system. As
society continues to move further away from the simple steam-engine world,
as Justice Breyer observes,114 a strong last line of defense is even more
important for a healthy patent system. The amassing of invalid patents and
the corresponding abuse by patent trolls has been at the forefront of policy
and scholarly discussions, but there has yet to be an effective solution.
Rather than providing a viable answer, Halo will lead the patent system
in the wrong direction by increasing costs and uncertainty and decreasing
efficiency and accessibility. By addressing three procedural aspects—
enhanced damages, pleading requirements, and venue rules—this Comment’s
proposal aims to improve upon a flawed litigation regime. Efforts to reduce
litigation costs will result in more cases proceeding to trial. Putting more
patents in front of judges will allow a greater quantity of invalid patents to
be weeded out. To escape the current trajectory—a future that is flooded with
patents of questionable validity and that lacks an adequately equipped
litigation structure—the Court should rein in the discretion authorized by
Halo and simultaneously tighten the pleading and venue rules.

many companies from filing suit in the Eastern District of Texas. See id. at Part II (noting the small
population and lack of businesses present in Marshall, Texas).
113 See supra notes 10–11.
114 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

